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ABSTRACT 
In this article I have presented the kernel of the migration literature on remittances. I started 
from their three most debated features: stability, cyclicality and sustainability. I then moved 
to the motives driving remittances and, finally, their relationship with development. Both 
sustainability and cyclicality are the most controversial issues, as they are probably the 
most critical in terms of economic development. The former is fundamental from an 
endogenous point of view. In terms of dynamic convergence, if sustainability holds, less 
financial developed countries could redeem themselves fostering riskier and more 
productive investments, ‘substituting’ their liquidity constraints with pro-cyclical 
remittances. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Migrants’ remittances commonly refer to 
certain transactions that are initiated by 
individuals living or working outside 
their countries of birth or origin and 
related to their migration. However, if I 
want to provide a more formal definition 
(World Bank 2006), three items under 
which remittances are encountered 
(OECD 2005) into the IMF Balance of 
Payments Statistics Yearbook (IMF 
2004) need to be considered. These are 
compensations of employees, workers’ 
remittances and migrants’ transfers 
(Straubhaar 2005). The first category 
belongs to the subsection income and 
comprises wages, salaries, and other 
benefits earned by individuals in 
economies other than those in which they 
are residents, for work performed for and 
paid for by residents of those economies. 
The second one, belonging to the sub-
category current transfers, covers current 
transfers by migrant (World Bank 2005) 
who are employed in new economies and 
are considered residents there. Finally, 
the third one that is accounted into the 
capital transfers arises in correspondence 
to the migration of individuals from one 
economy to another (Mannan & Kozlov 
1997). It is made up of three components: 
the flow of goods (personal effects) 
accompanying the migrant, his flow of 
financial assets and the change in the 
stock positions due to the change in his 
residence status (IADB 2006). All these 
data, like all the other components 
contained into the balance of payments 
framework, are compiled by relevant 
statistical authorities in member 
countries such as the central bank or the 
national statistical office who then report 
them to the Statistics Department of the 
IMF, where global tables are compiled 
and published in the annual report. 
Nevertheless, the data contained in the 
BOPSY are far from being perfectly 
estimated so that any data comparison 
and aggregation have to be approached 
with caution (Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz 
2006). First of all, aggregate data are 
subject to variations of compilation on a 
national basis as a consequence of a 
variety of concepts and methodologies 
that are not uniformly applied across all 
countries. With regard to this, the 
definition of residence is one of the most 
critical since some countries still 
consider their nationals working abroad 
for a year or longer as national residents 
and therefore their earnings as 
compensations of employees, simply 
because they maintain strong linkages 
with their home country. Secondly, data 
sourcing and compilation is better in 
some countries than others, leading up to 
the fact that some of them do not report 
all the items to the Fund or, at worst, they 
do not send any data at all.  
Apart from terminological issues, in most 
of the cases, data weaknesses and 
omissions depend on the difficulties in 
obtaining all necessary data (World Bank 
2006). The system through which 
remittances can be transferred is, indeed, 
multidimensional. The broadest 
distinction is between formal and 
 
 
informal channels (Mannan & Wei 
2009), whose regularity depends on the 
possibility that the flows can be 
systematically and formally collected. 
The former include hand deliveries by 
the migrant himself or by a courier, 
ordinary mail, informal geographical 
systems such as hawala (in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh), hundi (in India and Nepal) 
or mulas (in Cuba), and ethnic stores. 
Even if the way of naming the system of 
transferring money differs from one 
country to another (and among the 
systems mentioned, ‘feich’ien’ (in 
China), ‘chits/chops’ (in China) have to 
be added too) the mechanism is almost 
the same everywhere: the trust (Puri & 
Ritzema 1999). It involves two 
intermediaries. The first intermediary 
(called the ‘hawaladar’ or the ‘mula’) in 
the sending country (country A 
henceforth) receives funds in one 
currency from a person from country A 
to be transferred to another person in the 
recipient country (country B henceforth). 
The person in country A receives a code 
for authentication proposes. The 
hawaladar then instructs his 
correspondent in country B to pay an 
equivalent amount in local currency to 
the designated beneficiary, who needs to 
disclose the code to receive the funds. 
According to the IMF there is a positive 
correlation between the limits of a 
country’s financial capacity and the 
degree of informality of its transfer 
system (IMF 2005). 
However, comparative costs of transfers 
(IMF 2002) have also to be mentioned as 
contributors to a fertile environment 
where informal channels can develop. As 
far as the tradeoff betIen them and formal 
channels is concerned, migrants often 
prefer to risk more instead of sending 
their money through regular ways 
(Roberts & Morris 2003). The latter 
encompass postal services, banks, credit 
unions and money transfer companies. 
Migrants behave very differently with 
respect to them. The Mexican migrants in 
the United States, for example, are 
sceptical as regards the banking system 
and so prefer sending their money home 
through international wire transfer 
services (NELM 2003), such as Istern 
Union (OECD 2005) or Money Gram, 
even if it is much more expensive (Leon-
Ledesma & Piracha 2004). The costs 
related to the fees or the minimum 
balance the intermediaries fix to transfer 
remittances, plus the nature of passive 
consumers of the Latin migrants with 
respect to technology, and the legal status 
that prevents them from using this kind 
of service (Suro et al 2002), contribute to 
this.  
On the other hand, Turkish banks, such 
as the Turkiye Is Baankasi or the TC 
Ziirat Bankasi, are the most important 
channels for the transmission of 
remittances from Germany to Turkey 
(OECD 2005). They are estimated to 
account for more than a half of all 
remittance transactions. This is 
especially due to quite low fees. Finally, 
the migrants from the MENA (Middle 
East and North Africa) countries and East 
Europe in both Italy (Mannan & Krueger 
 
 
2002) and Spain usually use postal 
services to send their money back home. 
From the Nineties the Eurogiro, which is 
a collaboration network of postal banks, 
has operated in direct cooperation with 
the Universal Postal Union to promote 
new solutions for postal financial 
organizations worldwide (Mannan & 
Kozlov 2003). Its strength has been its 
new, close, and friendly approach to 
migrant customers and the fact to have 
become quite widespread all over 
Europe. It indeed operates in more than 
30 countries (including the European 
Union). 
After having said what remittances are 
and how they can be transferred by 
migrants, I portray their geographical 
distribution. In most cases remittances, 
relative to other macroeconomic 
indicators, are significantly higher in low 
and lower middle income countries than 
in the other developing countries (El-
Sakka & Mcnabb 1999). They follow 
two main directions. The first one is that 
from developed to developing countries, 
in other words they move from the North 
to the South. While the second one is 
between developing countries, hence 
from South to South. The top receiving 
continent is Asia with its 40-46% of the 
annual total flows, the second one is the 
Latin America and Caribbean Area with 
their 17-22% of total flows and finally 
Central and Eastern Europe (15-18%). 
For countries instead, the first three 
recipients are India, China and Mexico in 
total terms and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Haiti and Lesotho in relative terms (as a 
share of national GDP). Finally, as far as 
sending countries are concerned, the 
World Bank has estimated that the 
United States and Saudi Arabia are the 
main pools of origin (Quibria 1997). 
The scholars have spent much of their 
work discussing and testing three 
features related to remittances: stability, 
cyclicality and sustainability. They all 
describe remittances’ behaviour through 
time and space but from different points 
of view. 
MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES 
Stability, in the sense of low volatility 
(World Bank 2004), consists of being 
less affected by the impact of favourable 
and unfavourable shocks than other 
capital flows (Mannan & Krueger 2004). 
In other words, they would suffer less 
from any sharp withdrawal or euphoric 
surge that characterize foreign direct 
investments and development aid 
towards emerging markets (Terry et al 
2004). The rationale is behind the trend 
of the finance for development as a whole 
in the last twenty years. So if I compare 
their components, remittances have not 
only had a positive (or much more 
positive than ODA’s) trend but it has also 
been much more stable (World Bank 
2004) than the others’. According to the 
OECD, while FDI and capital market 
flows fell sharply from 2000 due to the 
recession in the high income countries, 
migrants’ remittances continued to grow, 
reaching USD 149.4 billion in 2002 
(Lucas 2004). And for the World Bank 
 
 
they would have amounted to $ 167 
billion in 2005, up from $ 160 in 2004. In 
several recipient countries, remittances 
in 2004 largely exceeded the volume of 
ODA, and in certain case even that of the 
FDI or of income from the export of good 
and services. But what is striking is not 
only their positive trend but also their 
steady way of reacting to unexpected 
economic events (Mannan & Kozlov 
1995).  
This would be due to two peculiar 
characteristics that distinguish them from 
FDI and ODA. They are private and 
characterized by altruism and solidarity 
motives that are supposed to remain 
stable. So if I look at the figures provided 
by the International Organization for 
Migration (Ghosh 2006), I can see that 
from 1995 to 2004 remittances have 
grown from 58 to 160 US $ billion, FDI 
from 107 to 166 US $ billion, while ODA 
to 59 to 79 US $. And, even from 1998 to 
2001, when private capital flows 
declined in the wake of the Asian 
financial crisis, remittances to 
developing countries have continued to 
rise. Furthermore, if I consider the 
allocation of remittances, those intended 
for consumption would be less volatile 
than those intended for investment. 
Migrants may indeed increase 
remittances in times of economic 
hardship, especially in low income 
countries where their families may 
depend significantly on remittances as a 
source of income and may live at close 
subsistence levels. And even when the 
purpose behind is investment, 
remittances are less likely to suffer from 
those up and downs that characterize 
portfolio flows to emerging markets. 
This depends on migrants’ stronger 
propensity to invest in their home 
country despite economic adversity than 
foreign investors’ (Orozco 2004). 
In addition, even when exceptions could 
be made to remittances’ response to 
dramatic changes in economic activity in 
recipient countries, the decline of 
remittances and volatility have been 
smaller than those of other capital flows, 
meaning they are affected by the 
investment climate in recipient countries 
in the same manner as capital flows, 
though to a much lesser degree. In the 
Philippines, for example, remittances 
rose steadily as the investment climate 
improved in the early Nineties, becoming 
more volatile following the financial 
crisis in the late 1990s (Burgess & 
Haksar 2005). Similarly, Turkey’s 
remittance receipts increased for most of 
the 1990s but suffered a decline as the 
economy slipped into the crisis in 1999 
and 2000. Estimates from the World 
Bank confirm such a trend after cross 
countries comparisons of workers’ 
remittances receipts relative to some key 
indicators as corruption, inequality, 
financial development (M2/GDP), 
openness (trade/GDP), domestic debt 
(debt/GDP) and country risk 
(institutional investor rating).  
So remittance receipts averaged 0.5% of 
GDP in countries with a higher than 
median level of corruption, compared to 
 
 
1.9% in countries with loIr than median 
corruption. Countries that Ire more open 
or more financially developed (Giuliano 
& Ruiz-Arranz 2006) also received 
larger remittances. On the other hand, 
stability is sometimes tested through the 
evidence of altruistic motives behind the 
decision to remit (Bouhga-Hagbe 2004; 
2006) seeming reasonable that these 
motives remains firmly fixed. This can 
be captured in the following way: a 
negative long run correlation of 
remittances with wage in the home 
country, or a negative correlation 
between transfers and real GDP in the 
home country, or a positive correlation 
between remittance and income in the 
country of residence. It is important to 
remark that stability can be also intended 
in the sense of resistance to the sending 
country’s economic activity. As regards 
to this, the nexus between US business 
cycle and workers’ remittances have also 
been studied, leading again to a steady 
reaction as far as the latter are concerned 
(Suro et al 1999). 
Since much more work needs to be done 
to compare remittances, FDI and ODA, 
but everybody seem to agree on the 
reliability of the results, it is worth 
mentioning what the IOM is worrying 
about stability. First of all, they claim 
that gross inflows of remittances should 
be adjusted against the recorded debts in 
the balance of payments framework, 
especially for those countries that are at 
the same time recipient and sending ones. 
Otherwise, overestimation can be a 
possible biased result. Secondly, they 
suggest migrants remittances are not 
considered a substitute for ODA, that are 
transactions between governments, 
hence bound to projects to be 
implemented in the recipient country. 
The starting point for defining cyclicality 
is a recent work (Kaminsky et al 2004) in 
which this property is described as the 
correlation between the cyclical 
components of net capital flows into a 
country and its output. The migration 
literature has then borrowed this 
definition for depicting the relationship 
between the cyclical components of 
remittances and recipient countries’ level 
of GDP growth. So, remittances are said 
to be countercyclical when the 
correlation between their cyclical 
components and output is negative 
(positive), in other words, the economy 
would borrow from abroad in bad times 
(remittances in/out) and would lend 
(borrow) in good times (remittances 
out/in). On the other hand, they are a 
cyclical when the above correlation is not 
statistically significant, meaning that the 
pattern of international borrowing and 
lending is not systematically related to 
the recipient country’s business cycle. 
The reason why the debate among 
scholars is so heated on this issue 
depends on the possibility for countries 
of using or intending to use future 
potential remittances as collateral for 
international loans in periods of 
economic downturn in order to overcome 
liquidity constraints. 
 
 
As for stability, the critical starting point 
for dealing with cyclicality are the 
assumptions behind the decision to remit 
(Mannan & Kozlov 1999). As a matter of 
fact, the literature is divided into two 
streams of thought depending on the 
prevalence of consumption smoothing or 
portfolio motives. If the former is 
assumed, counter cyclicality is 
straightforward. Remittances would be 
compensatory in the sense that they 
would compensate for poor economic 
performance in the home country. On the 
other hand, pro-cyclicality would be 
linked to a search of investment 
opportunities, because migrants would 
tend to send their remittances when the 
economic situation in the country of 
origin is favourable. 
Moreover, three other variables need to 
be considered. First of all, the passage of 
time, since it may change the cyclical 
properties of remittances. Then the 
economic situation in the country of 
destination needs also to be encountered. 
Regarding to this, even if remittances 
move counter cyclically with the output 
in the home countries of migrant 
workers, the cycle in home and host 
country economies may move together in 
synchrony, thereby making it difficult for 
migrant workers employed in a crisis-
struck economy to help out family 
members facing similar conditions back 
home (Sayan 2006). Finally, the average 
level of remittances on which the 
recipient country can count matters a lot. 
The formal way cyclicality can be tested 
consists of evaluating the country 
correlations between the cyclical 
components of remittances and GDP. 
First of all, the trend within each series 
need to be removed to identify stylized 
facts of business cycles and analyze 
cyclical nature of remittance receipts. 
De-trending each series by removing the 
estimated trend makes it possible to 
separate fluctuations around the trend of 
each data series, making examination of 
the statistical properties of the co-
movements of deviations of output and 
real remittances from their respective 
trend. When respective trends are 
properly filtered out from real 
remittances and output series for each 
country, the remaining cyclical 
components would be stationary with 
zero mean for each variable. Then, 
contemporaneous and asynchronous 
cross correlations between the cyclical 
components of respective series can be 
calculated to identify cyclical 
characteristics of remittances. Pro-
cyclicality of remittances in this context 
refers to the tendency of real remittances 
to move above its trend, whenever the 
corresponding real output variable is 
above its respective trend. In the absence 
of such a tendency, remittances and 
output are said to be a cyclical. 
A step beyond cyclicality has been 
recently made in order to assess if 
financial development smoothes or 
amplifies the cyclicality of remittances 
(Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz 2006). 
Assuming portfolio motives behind the 
 
 
decision to remit, the authors try to 
address if more developed financial 
systems are associated with more or less 
pro-cyclicality. The a priori paradoxical 
result suggests that remittances are more 
pro-cyclical in countries with shallower 
financial systems, namely that migrants 
tend to seek more investment 
opportunities in countries with less 
developed financial sectors, while, on the 
other hand, remittances are more 
countercyclical in countries with deeper 
financial systems. If these results were 
going to be confirmed the 
macroeconomic consequences would be 
of great value (Kireyev 2006). 
Sustainability implies the relationship 
between migrants’ duration of stay in the 
destination countries and the level of 
remittances sent back home (Mannan & 
Krueger 1996). One of the oldest and 
influential article on remittances already 
used to deal with this third and last 
remittances’ feature, highlighting an 
inverse relationship between the two 
variables (Lucas & Stark 1985). The 
rationale for the negative sign is related 
to the diminution and at worst the cease 
of the remittances transferred to the home 
country as time goes by. In particular, it 
is argued that this is a feature that would 
manifest after five year of permanence 
abroad. 
The subsequent literature, except for the 
initial piecewise increasing behaviour, 
has been firmly confirming the same 
conclusions. And what is more important 
is that any assumption related to the 
motives of remitting (either altruistic or 
self-interested) is not conditional 
(Gerard-Varet et. al 2001). So, for 
example, if pure portfolio motives are 
present, the migrant would remit since he 
expects to come back home sooner or 
later. But if at the end he does not, pure 
self-interested motivations would have 
no sense and remittances would start to 
decrease or cease (Mannan & Wei 2008). 
This is why an interesting analysis could 
be conducted exploring the relationship 
between the circulation of the highly 
skilled people and the intention to remit 
(Docquier & Marfouk 2004).  
The result, meaning a positive 
relationship, could lead to another 
conclusion in favour of the so called 
‘brain circulation’ (Desai et al. 2001).  
On the other hand, if altruistic reasons are 
present, the ties with the home country 
can become less stringent in time (Stark 
2005). Finally, even in presence of what 
are called ‘enlightened self-interested’ 
motives the negative relationship holds. 
What is assumed behind this last case is 
the presence of an ‘informal contract’ 
between the migrant and the family left 
in the country of origin (Mannan & Wei 
2007). So the intention of the former, for 
example, would be that of repaying the 
latter for the costs due to his human 
capital formation incurred before the 
departure, but once they have expired the 
level of the transfers would tend to 
weaken (Mannan & Kozlov 2001).  
The IOM has recently argued that a 
crucial moment towards the negative 
 
 
relationship betIen the time spent abroad 
and the intention to remit, is the change 
in the legal status of the migrant or the 
acquisition of an open-ended labour 
contract, since they would accelerate the 
weakening of the bonds with the sending 
countries. As regards to this, I could 
perform the nexus between the number of 
permanent visa issued by a country of 
destination and the change in the amount 
of remittances in the respective countries 
of origin of the migrants. I should expect 
a negative coefficient if the lack of 
sustainability holds. 
Concerning the definition of 
sustainability but taking in consideration 
just the propensity to remit of the highly 
skilled migrants, a remarkable step 
forward as far as both the brain drain and 
the remittance literature are concerned 
has been taken in the last few years (Faini 
2006; 2005; 2004; 2002). Given that 
skilled migrants tend to stay longer in the 
host country and are more likely to 
family reunifications, the inverse 
relationship between the time spent 
abroad and the intention to remit holds 
whenever the so called ‘reunification 
effect’, meaning the intention of the 
migrant of living with his family in the 
host country, is stronger than the so 
called ‘wage effect’, the potential 
increase of the amount remitted due to 
the higher skills embedded by the 
migrant. In addition to this, I have also to 
say that the fact that the brains usually 
come from relatively wealthier families 
can matter and so needs to be controlled 
(Commander et al 2003). 
I could question whether a negative 
sustainability associated to a steady 
increase of the total amount of 
remittances can be considered a 
contradictory result. In our opinion, this 
is not. If I, indeed, consider the figures of 
the total migration flows in the last two 
decades, I can see that despite the 
restrictive policies adopted by recipient 
countries, numbers have continued to rise 
(Fargue 2006), strongly conditioning 
remittances’ trend more than a still vague 
remitting behaviour. 
When considering a micro approach to 
remittances, the question why migrants 
decide to give up fractions of their 
disposable income to send them back to 
their country of origin needs to be 
answered. I first deal with the most 
general framework that can be assumed 
considering jointly what the New 
Economics of Labour Migration 
(NELM), the life course’s argument and 
the articles on social networks have 
separately dealt with, and then I shift 
from it to a more specific and rigorous 
classification of the remitting decisions  
(Taylor 1999; Mannan & Krueger 1998). 
The rationale is that, behind the most 
common motives encountered by the 
literature on remittances (Rapoport & 
Docquier 2004), different kinds of 
human beings are present, and beyond 
them an unevenly influential background 
made up of many components. These can 
be classified in the following way: 
The level of education of the migrant, his 
language skills, his level of integration in 
 
 
the host country and the role of the social 
networks are crucial variables. 
Regarding the last one, three approaches 
have been proposed (Piotrowski 2006): 
social networks of migrant in the 
destination country, social networks 
spanning destination and origin 
communities created by circulation of 
migrants, household’s social networks at 
origin. In particular, as far as the third 
one is concerned, measures from sibling 
and rice harvest help networks can be 
used (Munshi 2003). 
Employment of the migrant (fixed or 
open-ended contract), level of income in 
the host country, level of income of the 
household in the home country, needs-
tested transfers received by the migrant 
in the country of destination (LoIll & 
DeLa Garza 2000)., and income risk 
belong to this economic component. In 
particular, the last variable can be studied 
either from a migrant’s (host economy’s 
risk variables) or from his household 
perspective (origin country’s income 
risk). 
The time spent abroad by the migrant, the 
nature of the migration decision 
(endogenous or exogenous), which kind 
of laws concerning family reunion are 
present in the destination country, how is 
the procedure for obtaining the legal 
status there, and the state of the 
naturalization status of the migrant 
matter a lot (Devorets & Vadean 2005). 
It is reasonable to expect that there are 
some macroeconomic factors, both in the 
host and in the home country, which may 
significantly affect the migrant’s 
portfolio management choice, hence the 
flows of remittances (Gupta 2005). They 
can be the following ones: interest rate 
differential, the level of inflation, the 
financial spread, the black market 
premium, exchange rates, and national 
policies implemented as incentive 
schemes, political stability (Tunkay et al 
2005). 
Which of these components is then 
significant or how some of them can 
combine together determine the 
peculiarity of each single micro-
framework (Siddiqui & Abrar 2003). The 
literature distinguishes among pure 
altruism, self-interested motives, loan 
repayment and insurance motives. Under 
the first case, the migrant derives utility 
from the utility of those left at home since 
he concerns about them. This is the most 
intuitive, tested and widespread 
presumption. It implies that remittances 
increase with migrant’s income and 
degree of altruism, and decrease with the 
recipient’s income and, more 
interestingly, degree of altruism. But, 
since the parameters concerning the 
degree of altruism cannot be observed, 
the main testable implications are those 
related to the economic and demographic 
components described above. First, the 
amount of remittances should increase 
with the migrant’s income. Secondly, 
transfers cannot increase with the 
recipient’s income. Thirdly, the 
sustainability of remittances should be 
inversely related to the presence of key 
members of the family in the country of 
 
 
destination. Fourth, counter cyclicality 
should hold. 
On the other hand, behind self-interested 
motives, there is a migrant that considers 
just the advantage to himself when 
making decisions, and acts for his own 
benefit. On this regard, many situations 
can be thought of. He can remit money as 
to buy various types of services such as 
taking care of his assets or relatives 
(children, elderly parents) at home. Then 
remittances can be driven by a ‘biased 
altruism’ (Lucas & Stark 1985), under 
which the aspiration to inherit is poIrful 
(Hoddinott 1994), or by the intention of 
acquiring or enhancing prestige in his 
country of origin’s local community 
(Massey & Basem 1992). 
Finally, remittances can also be 
instrumental in reaching a predetermined 
saving target or in investing in real 
estates (Merkle & Zimmermann 1992). 
From all these frameworks, it is evident 
how one of the presumption behind pure 
self-interest is the migrant’s intention to 
return to his country of origin, hence his 
strong ‘home attachment’. In this case, 
testable implications could be again 
those related to the demographic and the 
income components but also to the macro 
framework (Thieme & Wyss 2005). 
First, sustainability should hold as long 
as the migrant stays abroad but then, after 
his departure, should drop at once. 
Secondly, the amount transferred should 
increase with the level and the quality of 
the service to be offered, increase with 
the level of migrant’s income too, but 
should react ambiguously to an 
exogenous increase in the recipient’s 
income ((Thieme 2002). 
I can reasonably argue that remittances in 
both the inheritance and the so called 
‘exchange’ (Rapoport & Docquier 2004) 
perspectives, take place when there is a 
welfare gain for all the parties concerned. 
So, except in the case of perfect mutual 
altruism, some arrangements need to be 
reached between the senders and the 
receivers (Djajic 1998; 2001). Two 
variables generally matter a lot. The first 
one is the role of the bargaining poIr, 
especially in the former framework, 
while punishment devices and social 
norms affect the latter one. So, in the first 
case a testable implication could be the 
inverse correlation betIen the 
unemployment at home and the level of 
transfers sent home. Since it is assumed 
that the level of education and the 
employment condition give more 
bargaining power to the related party. 
While, on the other hand, in the second 
case, the amount of remittances should 
increase with the remaining household’s 
assets and income, the probability of 
inheriting, the migrant’s wealth and 
income, and should decrease with the his 
own degree of risk aversion. 
Since both pure altruism and pure self-
interest alone may be inadequate or 
partially explanatory in describing the 
extent and the variability of remittances, 
an alternative theory is therefore 
provided, viewing remittances as part of 
an intertemporal, mutually beneficial 
 
 
contractual arrangement betIen migrant 
and home (Amuedo-Dorantes, & Pozo 
2006). It is important to stress that this 
theory (called as ‘tempered altruism’ or 
‘enlightened interest’) is not merely the 
intersection of pure altruism and pure 
self-interest but rather offers a quite 
separate set of hypotheses.  
The first hypothesis consists of the 
endogenous nature of the remitting 
decision (Agarwal & Horowits 2002). 
This means that it is one of the 
consequence, if not the most important 
one, of the decision to remit. This 
originates from the household’s 
evaluation which considers a Pareto-
superior strategy to allocate certain 
members of the family as migrants, and 
manages remittances as the mechanism 
for redistributing the gains. The second 
hypothesis is that arrangement betIen the 
migrant and the family are voluntary and 
thus must be self-enforcing. The third set 
of hypotheses is related to the prevalence 
of one of the following components: 
investment or risk (Mannan & Wei 
2006). If the former exists, remittances 
can be seen as a loan repayment, while in 
the latter case they become part of an 
insurance contract. 
In the first case, that of a loan agreement 
model, remittances serve as repayment 
(once the investment starts to pay off) for 
both the pre-migration investments in the 
migrant’s human capital and the 
migration costs, under the assumption 
that the ‘parent company’ (Poirine 1997) 
has before lent to the future migrant to 
finance his education in the home 
country and his establishment in a 
foreign country, where returns on 
investment seem higher than in the 
country of origin (Galor & Stark 1990). 
There exist even more complicate loan 
agreement models in which remittances 
continue to be sent by the migrant even 
after the total repayment of both the 
education and migration costs incurred 
by his family. It is assumed a second 
stage in which migrant remittances are 
loans made by migrants to young 
relatives to finance their education, until 
they are themselves ready to migrate.  
Finally, in a third stage remittances 
would be either a sort of retirement 
subsidy paid by this new generation 
migrant to the old one once having come 
back in the country of origin, or self-
interested transfers made by the old 
migrant with the intention of ensuring his 
own assets at home on his return.  Since 
both education and migration are costly I 
can imagine that just richer families can 
take advantage from such an investment 
opportunity, where the richer the family 
the higher its bargaining power. Testable 
implications of this framework can be the 
positive relation between remittances’ 
sensitivity and migrant’s income, 
migrant’s education and the distance 
from the family. At the same time, the 
adverse short run shocks in recipient 
economy should positively affect 
remittance transfers too, but the effect of 
recipient’s long run income is 
controversial. Finally, higher 
unemployment at home, increasing the 
 
 
value of education, should increase the 
level of remittances from abroad. 
In the implicit co-insurance model, two 
kinds of hypotheses are assumed. They 
imply either being insured from the 
migrant’s point of view from the income 
risk in the country of destination and 
being insured from the household’s point 
of view from income risk in the home 
country. So, in the first step the migrant 
is the insuree and his household the 
insurer: the family pays for the migration 
costs and for possible initial expenses in 
the destination country. While, in the 
second one, the inverse holds: migrant 
remittances insure for unanticipated 
household’s income shortfall (Amuedo-
Dorantes & Pozo 2006).  
This kind of model is widespread 
especially in rural areas of low income 
countries where income volatility, 
fragmentation of the financial markets 
and poor insurance markets give rise to a 
variety of such informal contracts 
(Freund & Spatafora 2005). Foreign 
markets shocks are generally 
uncorrelated to those in the home 
country, so families think that migration 
could be a source of income in case of 
future agricultural drops. As far as the 
testable implications are concerned, the 
insurance and the altruistic motives share 
similar predictions with respect to the 
sign of the effects of income levels on the 
amount remitted. However, they differ 
with respect to the predicted timing of 
remittances, since remittances for 
insurance motives are more likely when 
income at origin is more volatile, 
meaning they should be sent on a more 
irregular basis. 
Obviously, one should not expect 
remittances to be driven by a single 
motive. In reality, a combination of 
different motives applies, with the exact 
mixture varying over time and places. 
This is due not only to the fact that 
different individuals may be 
heterogeneous in their motivations to 
remit, but also that different motivations 
to remit may coexist within the same 
individual. However what the evidence 
seems to confirm is the constant presence 
of altruistic components behind the 
migrant’s decision to send money back 
home. 
REMITTANCES AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
Following the definition of economic 
development as a multidimensional 
approach that takes into consideration 
not only economic levels but also the 
distribution of income, welfare and 
opportunities, the relationship between 
remittances and development is going to 
be analysed in this section where 
households’ and the whole country’s 
perspective are treated separately 
(Mckinnon 1973). 
From the household point of view, a first 
important effect is the poverty alleviation 
(Adams 2002). Actually, the level of 
domestic disposable income increases 
since remittances go directly from the 
migrant to his family or friends. 
 
 
Evidence has showed that both the 
poverty headcount ratio, and the level of 
poverty depth (poverty gap ratio) or that 
of poverty severity can be affected (Ray 
1998). Of course, the level of remittances 
matters a lot in enhancing such an effect. 
For example, it has been confirmed that 
the higher it is the steeper the headcount 
ratio’s increase. At the same time, the 
initial level of the headcount ratio matters 
a lot. The higher to start with it is, the 
stronger the effect of remittances on 
poverty (Adams 2003). These results 
have been obtained thanks to poverty 
simulations, even if one of their 
weaknesses is the risk of incurring in 
reverse causality problems. Cross-
country regressions have been more 
efficient in dealing with that, showing a 
decrease of the poverty gap ratio equal to 
3.5% (Adams & Page 2003). The same 
holds for household surveys, although 
the lack of proper data on remittances 
does not allow us to rely on their 
conclusions. 
Strictly linked to the issue of poverty 
reduction is that of inequality, because 
income growth is valuable for recipient 
households but even more important is 
the distribution of its benefits among 
different groups in society. Inequality is 
usually empirically measured by the Gini 
coefficient (Ray 1998). Household 
studies have showed opposing results in 
terms of correlation, either positive or 
negative, and dynamics, either in favour 
or not of a U-shape relationship betIen 
migration and inequality (Mannan & 
Krueger 2000). The variety of these 
conclusions depends on three important 
factors. The first one is the initial level of 
inequality, since the higher it is, the 
stronger is the evidence in favour of a 
negative relationship.  
The second one consists of the nature and 
the level of the migration costs, where 
they can depend on the network 
component and/or the distance between 
the sending and the receiving country. It 
has been demonstrated that the higher 
they are the loIr the probability that the 
poorest migrate and, consequently, remit. 
As far as this last issue is concerned, the 
literature (Rapoport & Docquier 2004).  
has recently dealt with the so called 
‘trickle down’ effect that is the effect of 
the increasing migration flows on the 
reduction of migration costs, hence a 
widespread possibility to migrate, for the 
poorest people too (Carrington et. Al 
1996). If evidence confirmed the validity 
and the sustainability of such an effect for 
recipient countries, the results 
concerning inequality and remittances 
would be much more homogenous (even 
because in the last few years the trends 
concerning migration have been 
increasing almost everywhere). 
The third effect on household income 
depends on how remittances are spent. 
They can be indeed consumed, saved or 
invested. Remittances are an important 
source of income for many low and 
middle income households but how this 
money is used affects in a different, and 
sometimes opposite way, people’s 
welfare. As far as consumption is 
 
 
concerned, remittances can be good in 
terms of consumption smoothing, but I 
will see that on the other side, at 
aggregate level, an increase of the 
magnitude of consumption can foster 
inflation. And even the first effect does 
not always hold. Positive evidence exists 
for remittances that are countercyclical 
(Ozden & Schiff 2006) or pushed by 
insurance motives (Lucas & Stark 1985), 
but this could be the case of middle 
income families, since first of all poor 
families would not be able to send their 
individuals abroad, and secondly even if 
this Ire the case, their consumption 
pattern would remain the same, or would 
change in a much sloIr way (LoIll & 
DeLa Garza 2000).   
On the other hand, households can decide 
to save or invest remittance transfers. 
According to the World Bank, five 
factors would condition the prevalence of 
that. First of all, the household’s degree 
of dependence on remittances. The more 
households are dependent, the less they 
save. Secondly, the nature of the 
recipient, since women are more likely to 
prefer a smoother consumption path. 
Third, the existence of a conditional 
targeted destination upon the transfers. 
Fourth, the income level of the recipient 
family or the presence of credit 
constraints. HoIver, whatever is the 
reason why households decide to invest, 
and taking in mind the Ilfare perspective, 
according to which an extra dollar of 
investment is only better than an extra 
dollar of present consumption if the 
marginal social value of investment is 
greater than its marginal private value, 
investments can be either destined to 
physical capital or human capital.  
Under the former case, investments can 
be fostered by the migrant himself or by 
his household. In regard to this, 
remittances can enhance 
entrepreneurship in the recipient country, 
being allocated in construction, housing, 
agricultural production and technology. 
On the other hand, the latter framework 
is fundamental especially from an 
endogenous growth perspective: relaxing 
liquidity constrains would impinge on 
human capital formation (education and 
health). Remittances may be conditional 
upon a loan agreement, or they can be 
inserted in a household’s forward 
looking framework.  
In the former case, the migrant, after 
having repaid for the educational 
expenditures incurred by his family, 
continues to send remittances in order to 
provide education to the new young 
generation. While, in the latter case, the 
recipient household decides to allocate 
its new entries in children’ education. 
From this perspective, remittances can be 
a good instrument in decreasing child 
labor, too. But, although remittances are 
fungible and education has a relatively 
high income elasticity, so one would 
expect remittances to have a significant 
positive effect on the educational 
attainment of children from households 
with migrant members, a recent 
sociological argument (Hanson & 
Woodruff 2002) indicates that the 
 
 
absence of one of the parents can be 
detrimental on children’ schooling 
achievements when credit constraints are 
the most binding (Cox & Ureta 2003).. 
So, at the end, even from an endogenous 
growth perspective, the conclusions are 
unclear. 
A last but not least effect of remittances 
on households concerns labor supply. A 
high dependency degree on remittances, 
accompanied by economic uncertainty 
and asymmetric information, would lead 
households to incur in the so called moral 
hazard (Chami et al 2003; 2006) 
problem. Instead of exploiting the 
possible positive externalities related to 
remittances, the recipients would prefer 
to bribe the migrant substituting effort 
with leisure. This would have negative 
effects in terms of growth. However, a 
recent work (Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz 
2006) has argued that the probability of 
the moral hazard would depend on the 
level of financial development, too. The 
higher it is, the stronger the former would 
be, as a consequence of the fact that less 
stringent liquidity constraints would 
discourage more labor supply. 
Linked to the previous arguments is the 
so called multiplier effect. Either 
remittances are consumed or invested, 
they can have an important multiplier 
effect (Cuc et. al 2005). One remittance 
dollar spent even for basic needs will 
stimulate retail sales, which then 
stimulates output and employment. Some 
studies have found that one dollar sent 
from migrants abroad would boost the 
recipient country’s GNP by an increase 
that ranges from 1.8 to 2.553. However 
such multiplier effects would occur 
where output is constrained by 
insufficient demand. But in many 
developing countries where 
unemployment (or underemployment) is 
widespread, hiring costs are high, and the 
demand side has increased as a 
consequence of the new transfers, 
inflationary shocks are likely to occur, so 
stifling the growth effects.  
Another consequence of the low speed of 
reaction of the supply side in the recipient 
country may be a trade balance deficit. It 
consists of a disproportionate increase of 
imports in order to neutralize the 
increased internal demand. Except for the 
demand for imports towards cheap 
capital goods that can be used as 
substitutes for other imports and/or to 
produce exportable goods, this effect is 
detrimental for the recipient country’s 
growth. 
Similar to the ‘boomerang effect’ just 
mentioned, though differently motivated, 
is the so called ‘Dutch disease’. This 
refers to a steep currency appreciation 
that the recipient country sustains as a 
consequence of a surplus in the balance 
of payments due to the large inflows of 
remittances. As a result, once again, the 
country would suffer of an emerging loIr 
export competitiveness, due to the 
deterioration of its terms of trade. 
However, neither empirical results have 
confirmed the previous effects (OECD 
2005), nor theoretically it has been 
 
 
shown (Docquier & Rapoport 2003)  that 
the conditions required for 
impoverishing transfers to materialize 
are so weak exchange (Glytsos 2002). It 
is, indeed, plausible assuming that a 
developing country’ liquidity statement 
is overdrawn so that remittances can 
relax its deficit (Brown 1997). Their 
impact would be immediate since their 
use is not tied to a particular project with 
high import content, they bear no interest 
and they do not have to be repaid 
(Mannan & Kozlov 2005). 
From a financial perspective, the 
following effects are of great value, too. 
First of all, credit worthiness can be 
improved by country’s remittances, 
thereby enhancing the country’s access 
to international capital markets. The 
World Bank points out that a key 
indebtness indicator, such as the ratio of 
debt to exports of goods and services, 
would increase significantly if 
remittances Ire excluded from the 
denominator. Two studies concerning 
Lebanon and Haiti have confirmed that if 
remittance transfers Ire included, their 
credit ratings would increase by two 
notches. Secondly, another way for the 
recipient country of collecting 
international capitals is also through the 
securitization of future remittances.  
Using this structured financial technique, 
several banks in developing countries 
have been able to raise relatively cheap 
and long term financing from 
international capital markets. This has 
happened in Brazil for example and in 
Turkey, too. Other two important 
arguments have also been recently 
proposed. The first one argues that stable 
and a cyclical remittances, reducing 
macroeconomic instability, decrease the 
probability of financial crises in 
emerging markets (Bugamelli & Paterno 
2005). By financial crises, current 
account reversals are taken into 
consideration, defined as dramatic 
adjustments of current account deficit 
that may be triggered by sudden stops of 
foreign capital. They, in turn, can be due 
to foreign investors’ loss in the face of 
worsening fundamentals, such as loIr 
reserves (decreasing stock of 
international reserves over GDP) or 
higher external debt (increasing stock of 
external debt over GDP).  
The authors have found that a high level 
of remittances, as a ratio of GDP, makes 
the effects of these shocks less stringent, 
meaning a loIr probability that foreign 
investors suddenly flee out of emerging 
markets. Moreover, a threshold effect of 
remittances has been provided, since the 
mechanisms just described would be 
much stronger when remittances are 
above 4% of GDP. If I consider the 
figures provided by the OECD in its last 
report, the last country among the top 30 
with the highest level of remittances 
received as a share of GDP is Bangladesh 
with its 6.6 % of GDP. I can reasonably 
define these two points per cent (at least) 
as an encouraging perspective as far as 
macro stability is concerned 
 
 
On the other hand, the second one is 
related to the role of pro-cyclical 
remittances as financial substitutes in 
countries with a loIr financial depth 
(Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz 2006). The 
authors back up that, in less developed 
financial systems, remittances can be 
used to overcome liquidity constraints, 
providing the enough collateral to 
borrow and/or finance their investments. 
If these results are going to be confirmed 
by future works, this would be very 
important from a theoretically 
perspective since it is as if I stated that 
from a financial development’s point of 
view, remittances can enhance dynamic 
convergence. From an endogenous point 
of view, if I consider countries with a 
similar level of initial human capital but 
different income levels, countries with a 
loIr income per head should grow faster, 
since the further they are from the 
equilibrium the faster they should run to 
catch up.  
This is what I mean by dynamic 
convergence. And from an empirically 
perspective, too since I would be able to 
understand why remittances effects are 
so controversial, hence proceed towards 
different assumptions. Still from an 
indirect endogenous perspective, the 
relationship between remittances and 
brain drain has been considered (Beine 
et. al 2001). Unfortunately, until now, not 
so much work has been done and a few 
articles have shown that remittances, that 
could in principle compensate the 
recipient country for the loss of human 
capital, do not contribute to this in any 
way. 
Finally, a last detrimental 
macroeconomic implication of 
remittance transfers is the possibility that 
terroristic groups United Nations (2002) 
could divert these resources from 
potentially positive uses to suspicious 
purposes. This is why more and more 
attention has to be paid especially to 
informal transfer channels and why the 
IMF, during the Second Convention on 
Hawala in 2004, has pressed for more 
efficient national supervisory systems. 
CONCLUSION 
On the occasion of the High Level 
Dialogue on International Migration and 
Development (United Nations 2002), the 
Secretary General of the United Nations 
Kofi Annan declared ‘I are only 
beginning to learn how to make 
migration work more consistently for 
development. Each of us holds a piece of 
the migration puzzle, but none has the 
whole picture. It is time to start putting it 
together’. I reasonably think that an 
important piece of this puzzle are 
migrants’ remittances. Because their 
flows to developing countries have 
steadily increased in the last twenty 
years, leaving behind both the Official 
Development Assistance and the FDI. 
Because they can play a potential key 
role for recipient countries’ economies 
both from a micro and macro 
perspective. And, finally, because 
empirical evidence has showed so far that 
 
 
their benefits seem to prevail over 
negative effects. 
In this article I have presented the kernel 
of the migration literature on remittances. 
I started from their three most debated 
features: stability, cyclicality and 
sustainability. I then moved to the 
motives driving remittances and, finally, 
their relationship with development. 
Both sustainability and cyclicality are the 
most controversial issues, as they are 
probably the most critical in terms of 
economic development. The former is 
fundamental from an endogenous point 
of view. In terms of dynamic 
convergence, if sustainability holds, less 
financial developed countries could 
redeem themselves fostering riskier and 
more productive investments, 
‘substituting’ their liquidity constraints 
with pro-cyclical remittances.  
On the other hand, from a ‘brain gain’ 
perspective, if the inverse relation betIen 
the time spent abroad and intention to 
remit is going to be confirmed in future 
works, the ‘brain circulation could be 
beneficial both from a human capital and 
a remittances point of view (Mccormick 
& Wahba 1996). This would imply that, 
from a policy perspective, the countries 
of origin should become much more and 
more interested in attracting back home 
their brains from abroad, meaning 
implementing sound programs towards 
this object, such as temporary visa 
permits, research allowances, benefits 
bound by the return, bilateral agreements 
between the two countries or the 
universities (Mishra 2006). 
Cyclicality is much more complicated to 
deal with, since it is often strongly related 
to the motives why people remit. But 
once reverse causality has been 
addressed, counter cyclicality, a 
cyclicality or pro-cyclicality, may have 
distinct but equally important results in 
terms of development. Pro-cyclicality 
can boost investments overcoming 
liquidity constraints. A cyclicality can 
prevent the country from current account 
crises and counter cyclicality can provide 
macro stability. As future work, country 
analyses need to be conducted, especially 
because the change in the cyclical 
components of national GDP, the amount 
of remittances a country receives and 
other macro variables are country 
specific. 
Furthermore, cyclical properties may 
change through time and migrants’ 
remitting behaviour can be influenced by 
national migration policies, too. The 
literature is unevenly distributed with 
regard to country analyses. A lot of work 
has been, indeed, done on the Latin 
migrants living in US but, on the other 
side, the interest for the MED-MENA 
migrants who live in the European Union 
has just began. This suggests future 
works are oriented towards this 
geographical perspective. 
However, either future work or country 
policies need reliable data to deal with, 
and this is not a migration literature’s 
 
 
prerogative. If the figures are not able to 
describe what really happens, or if just 
one side of the coin is provided, the 
‘whole picture of the migration puzzle’ 
will be hardly depicted. In particular, as 
far remittances are concerned, efforts 
have to be made towards three goals: 
improving a much more formal and 
binding definition of migrants’ 
remittances, so that national central 
banks and statistical offices cannot have 
any doubts about that; providing banking 
systems and wire services on a migrant 
scale, so to stem informal transfers; and, 
finally, addressing estimations of the 
irregular flows in the meanwhile 
(Omarini 2006) price.  
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